Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: Theory and Experiment

Games and Economic Behavior 2015

We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single- or multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not. The simultaneous second-price, on the other hand, leads to inefficiency with or without resale possibility. Our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale in second-price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case. However, after resale, the efficiency rate in second-price is as high as that of Vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment. Preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second-price format.


Recommended citation: Filiz-Ozbay, E., Lopez Vargas, K., & Ozbay, E. Y. (2015)."Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: Theory and Experiment." Games and Economic Behavior. 89, 1-16.